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Abstract
This paper presents a new extension of the Rubinstein-St˚ahl bargaining model to
the case with n players, called sequential share bargaining. The bargaining protocol is
natural and has as its main feature that the players’ shares in the cake are determined
sequentially. The bargaining protocol requires unanimous agreement for proposals to
be implemented. Unlike all existing bargaining protocols with unanimous agreement,
the resulting game has unique subgame perfect equilibrium utilities for any value of
the discount factor. In equilibrium, agreement is reached immediately. The results
are therefore qualitatively the same as in the two player case. The result builds on
an analysis of so-called one-dimensional bargaining problems. We show that also
one-dimensional bargaining problems have unique subgame perfect equilibrium utili-
ties for any value of the discount factor, and that also in one-dimensional bargaining
problems agreement is reached immediately.
Keywords: Noncooperative bargaining, dynamic games, subgame perfect equilib-
rium, unanimous agreement.
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1 Introduction
In many socioeconomic problems, parties can create a surplus by collaborating. Bargaining
problems study the distribution of the surplus over the parties involved. In the strategic
theory of bargaining, a detailed process of negotations concerning the surplus is described,
which is then analyzed by the tools of game theory. A commonly studied negotiation
process is the one of alternating offers bargaining, first studied by St˚ahl (1972) under the
assumption of an exogenous deadline, next extended by Rubinstein (1982) to the case of
an infinite horizon.
In the Rubinstein-St˚ahl bargaining model, two players have to reach an agreement on
the partition of a cake of a given size. Players make in turn a proposal as to how to divide
the cake. After an offer by a player, the other player decides whether to accept it, or to
reject it and continue the bargaining process by making an offer himself. After acceptance,
a proposal is implemented. The game has a unique subgame perfect equilibrium under
weak assumptions. In the unique subgame perfect equilibrium, the proposal of the first
proposer is immediately accepted by his opponent.
This analysis does not carry over to bargaining problems with n players. As reported in
Osborne and Rubinstein (1990), a first extension to the n-person case is due to Shaked and
consists of an example involving three players. In this example, player 1 starts by making
a public proposal about splitting the cake to the other two players. A proposal consists of
specifying a share in the cake for each of the players. The other players must accept or reject
this proposal sequentially. If all agree, the proposal is implemented, otherwise it is rejected,
one period of time elapses, and the next player makes a new proposal. Bargaining continues
in this way. Herrero (1985) and Haller (1986) show that there is no unique subgame perfect
equilibrium for the n-person case if the discount factor is sufficiently high. In particular,
any feasible agreement is supported by a subgame perfect equilibrium, and equilibria with
arbitrarily long delay exist.
Alternative extensions of the Rubinstein-St˚ahl bargaining model are given by Jun
(1987), Chae and Yang (1988), Yang (1992), Chae and Yang (1994), Krishna and Ser-
rano (1996), Huang (2002), and Suh and Wen (2006). These authors consider games with
partial agreement, also referred to as exit games. In an exit game, players need not agree
unanimously to a proposal. In case of partial agreement, those players who have accepted
the proposal may exit the game with the shares awarded by the proposer. These papers
reproduce the basic results of the 2-player case for the n-player case. Under weak assump-
tions, a unique subgame perfect equilibrium exists, and in this equilibrium agreement is
reached without delay.
This paper studies n-person bargaining problems where unanimous agreement of all
players is needed before an agreement can be implemented. This feature is common to many
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real-life bargaining situations, where it is not allowed for players to leave the bargaining
table with only partial agreements of others.
Our bargaining protocol is as follows. An agenda specifies the order in which players’
shares must be determined. The share of the player who is on top of the agenda, say
player 1, is being negotiated first. Once all players agree on the share of player 1, this
player exits the game and the remaining players proceed to negotiate over the share of the
player who is next on the agenda, say player 2. Once all players agree on player 2’s share,
the remaining players negotiate over the share of the next player on the agenda, and so
on, and so forth. We refer to this bargaining procedure as sequential share bargaining.
Suppose player i’s share is being negotiated in period t. The players whose share has
not been determined yet are called the active players. Nature selects one of the active
players to make a proposal. This player proposes the share of the cake to be allocated
to player i. The remaining players react, sequentially, to the proposal. If the proposal is
unanimously agreed upon, player i obtains his share and exits the game. The remaining
players then proceed to negotiate over the share of the next player on the agenda. Without
unanimous agreement, period t ends and time moves to period t+1. The utility of a player
who obtains a share x of the cake in period t is δtx, where δ is the common discount factor.
In determining the share of player i, it is natural to think about player i as being involved
in a bargaining situation between two coalitions. One coalition consists of player i himself,
the other coalition of all opponents of player i. All players in the latter coalition share a
preference for making the share awarded to player i as small as possible.
To solve the game resulting from the sequential share bargaining procedure, we first
study so-called one-dimensional bargaining problems. A one-dimensional bargaining prob-
lem consists of two rival coalitions that bargain over the choice of x in an interval [0, X],
where X > 0 is the surplus that the rival coalitions have to share. The utility functions of
players in S are identical and monotonically increasing in x. The utility functions of play-
ers in T are identical too, but monotonically decreasing in x. One-dimensional bargaining
problems are also studied in Banks and Duggan (2000) and Cho and Duggan (2003).
Although we need the one-dimensional bargaining problem as a building block to obtain
results for sequential share bargaining, one-dimensional bargaining problems are worth
studying in their own right. Many real-life bargaining situations can be approximated
by the case where the bargaining space is one-dimensional, the players involved can be
partitioned in two groups, with preferences within the group identical, and between groups
diametrically opposed. Examples include the division of a fixed budget over two possible
goals, the location of a public facility on a line, and negotiations between two firms (where
a firm is viewed upon as a collection of agents with identical preferences) or between a firm
and an individual about the price of a product or service.
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We show that one-dimensional bargaining leads to unique subgame perfect equilib-
rium utilities. A subgame perfect equilibrium is characterized by the absence of delay. We
provide a linear system of characteristic equations that makes the computation of the equi-
librium strategy profile an easy task. Cho and Duggan (2003) consider a one-dimensional
bargaining model with quadratic utilities and decision making by a coalition in a set of deci-
sive coalitions. For the Cho and Duggan specification of the model, the concept of subgame
perfect equilibrium in stationary strategies is needed to obtain uniqueness of equilibrium.
Surprisingly, in our model subgame perfection suffices to obtain unique predictions.
From our results on one-dimensional bargaining problems, we derive by means of the
following induction argument that the subgame perfect equilibrium utilities in sequential
share bargaining are uniquely determined. Clearly, 1-person sequential share bargaining
problems have unique subgame perfect equilibrium utilities. The unique equilibrium utili-
ties of an n-person sequential share bargaining situation can be substituted in all subgames
of an (n+1)-person sequential share bargaining problem where the share of the first person
on the agenda has been decided upon. The resulting reduced sequential share bargaining
game belongs to the class of one-dimensional bargaining problems, having unique subgame
perfect equilibrium utilities. Moreover, the equilibria in sequential share bargaining games
are characterized by absence of delay.
Section 2 introduces the one-dimensional bargaining problem and Section 3 its charac-
teristic equations. In Section 4 it is shown that the one-dimensional bargaining problem
leads to unique subgame perfect equilibrium utilities. Section 5 defines the game under-
lying the sequential share bargaining procedure. Building on the result of Section 4, it
is shown in Section 6 that sequential share bargaining leads to unique subgame perfect
equilibrium utilities. Section 7 concludes.
2 One-dimensional Bargaining
This section studies one-dimensional bargaining with unanimous agreement. In a one-
dimensional bargaining game Γˆ, a finite set of players N has to agree on the choice of x
in a non-degenerate interval [0, X]. The n players in N are partitioned in the non-empty
coalitions S and T. All players in S have identical preferences that are monotonically
increasing in x. All players in T have identical preferences that are monotonically decreasing
in x.
The game Γˆ is a dynamic game of perfect information in discrete time. At each time
period t = 0, 1, . . . nature selects a proposer from the set N . The chosen player makes a
proposal, i.e. a choice for x in the interval [0, X]. We denote a proposal by player i ∈ N by
xi. The remaining players respond, sequentially, to the proposal. We assume that first all
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players belonging to the proposer’s coalition respond, followed by all players in the other
coalition. Either a proposal is unanimously accepted, it is implemented, and the game
ends. Or some player rejects the proposal, period t + 1 begins, and nature selects a new
proposer. An outcome of the game is either a perpetual disagreement or a pair (t, x), i.e.
x is agreed upon in period t.
To select a proposer, nature chooses according to a Markov process with state space
N . The transition probabilities of the process are given by the transition matrix pi. Thus
piij is the probability of a transition from state i to state j, i.e. if the last proposer has
been player i, then with probability piij the next proposer is player j. The first proposer is
chosen according to a probability distribution pi0 on N.
The players in coalition S have identical preferences over outcomes. The utility of
a player i ∈ S who receives outcome x in period t is ui(t, x) = δtx, with the utility of
perpetual disagreement being 0. Similarly, the players in T have identical preferences. The
utility of a player i ∈ T who receives outcome x in period t is ui(t, x) = δt(X−x), with the
utility of perpetual disagreement being 0. Here, δ ∈ (0, 1) is the common discount factor.
A one-dimension bargaining game is Γˆ = {S, T,X, δ, (ui)i∈S∪T , pi0, pi}.
When S and T are both singletons, the game Γˆ is a two-player game and contains
Rubinstein (1982) as a special case. Merlo and Wilson (1995) have generalized the Rubin-
stein set-up substantially and allow for a proposer selected by a Markov process. But since
they consider bargaining problems where the dimension of the bargaining space equals the
number of players minus one, one-dimensional bargaining with more than two players is
not covered by their analysis.
Since members of a given coalition have identical preferences, it is tempting to assume
that they should adopt the same strategy. Then each coalition can be seen a single player
and the game Γˆ is in essence a two-player game. This reasoning is not correct, even if
one restricts attention to stationary strategies. The reason is that though preferences are
identical within a coalition, the transition probabilities pi depend on the identity of the
proposer, implying that different players of the same coalition have different positions in
the bargaining game. As a consequence, different members of a given coalition may find it
optimal to make different proposals.
3 The Characteristic Equations for One-dimensional
Bargaining
In this section we derive a subgame perfect equilibrium of the game Γˆ from the solution to
a linear system of characteristic equations.
For a player i in N and a coalition C, i.e. a member of {S, T}, the variable ziC denotes
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the continuation utility of a member of coalition C after the rejection of a proposal made
by player i. All members of a given coalition have the same preferences, so receive the same
utility in any outcome of the game. The characteristic equations of Γˆ describe a particular
subgame perfect equilibrium in terms of the variables ziC . The characteristic equations are
as follows:
ziT = piiTX + δ
∑
j∈S
piijz
j
T − δ
∑
j∈T
piijz
j
S, i ∈ N, (1)
ziS = piiSX − δ
∑
j∈S
piijz
j
T + δ
∑
j∈T
piijz
j
S, i ∈ N, (2)
where piiC =
∑
j∈C piij. This is a system of 2n equations and 2n unknowns.
The idea behind system (1)–(2) is that a proposal of any member of coalition C leaves
any member of the rival coalition N \ C indifferent between accepting and rejecting the
proposal. Thus, a player j ∈ S makes a proposal X − δzjT . Such a proposal makes all
members of coalition T indifferent between acceptance and rejection, since either action
results in utility δzjT . Similarly, a player j ∈ T makes a proposal δzjS. Such a proposal
makes each member of S indifferent between acceptance and rejection, since either action
results in utility δzjS.
Now suppose that a proposal of player i has been rejected. Then the continuation
utility of any member of coalition S is∑
j∈S
piij(X − δzjT ) +
∑
j∈T
piijδz
j
S.
Setting this expression equal to ziS gives equation (2). In a similar way, we find that the
continuation utility of any member of T equals∑
j∈S
piijδz
j
T +
∑
j∈T
piij(X − δzjS).
Setting this expression equal to ziT gives equation (1).
Theorem 3.1 The system of characteristic equations (1)–(2) has a unique solution.
Proof. Adding up equations (1) and (2) for fixed i we obtain the equation ziT + z
i
S = X.
We can therefore express each zjT as X − zjS and substitute this into equations (2). This
yields
ziS = (1− δ)piiSX + δ
∑
j∈N
piijz
j
S. (3)
It is sufficient to show that system (3) has a unique solution. System (3) is a system of n
equations and n unknowns that can be rewritten in vector-matrix notation as zS = y+δpizS.
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Because pi is a row-stochastic matrix, the spectral radius of pi is at most 1. It follows that
the matrix I − δpi is invertible, where I is the identity matrix. The result follows.
We define a profile of strategies σˆ = (σˆi)i∈N that will be verified to constitute a subgame
perfect equilibrium of Γˆ. Let the 2n-dimensional vector z be a solution to the system of
characteristic equations (1)–(2). The behavioral strategy of a player i ∈ S is defined as
follows. Whenever player i is selected to make a proposal, he proposes xi = X − δziT , and
whenever player i is selected to respond to a proposal xj of player j ∈ N, he accepts if and
only if xj ≥ δzjS. The behavioral strategy of a player i ∈ T is defined as follows. Whenever
player i is selected to make a proposal, he proposes xi = δz
i
S, and whenever player i is
selected to respond to a proposal xj of player j ∈ N, he accepts if and only if xj ≤ X−δzjT .
When players play according to strategy profile σˆ, bargaining proceeds as follows. If
player i ∈ S is selected to make a proposal, he proposes xi = X − δziT . Next the players
in S respond. They accept if and only if xi ≥ δziS. This inequality holds strictly, since
ziS+ z
i
T = X and δ < 1, so as a consequence all players i ∈ S accept. Next the players in T
respond. They accept if and only if xi ≤ X − δziT , an inequality that holds with equality,
so all players in T accept.
If a player i ∈ T is selected to make a proposal, bargaining proceeds in basically the
same way. His proposal xi equals δz
i
S, which is first accepted by all responders in T and
next accepted by all responders in S.
Theorem 3.2 The strategy profile σˆ is a subgame perfect equilibrium of the game Γˆ.
Proof. Consider a subgame Γˆ(h) of Γˆ that starts at node h of Γˆ. Suppose a player i ∈ N
has a profitable deviation, which increases the subgame utility by ε > 0. Since the utility
player i can get from a node that is t periods later than the initial node of the subgame is
bounded by δt, player i has a profitable deviation σ¯i that deviates from σˆi only at nodes
corresponding to the first T periods, where T equals ln(ε)/ ln(δ).
Consider a node h′ where player i, when playing according to σ¯i, deviates from σˆi, and
which is not succeeded by another node where i deviates from σˆi. Consider the subsubgame
Γˆ(h′) starting at this node. Then either σ¯i induces a profitable deviation in the subsubgame,
or the strategy σ˜i that is equal to σ¯i, except at h′, where σ˜i(h′) = σˆi(h′), is a profitable
deviation from σˆi in subgame Γ(h). Iterating this argument, we can show that there is
a subgame Γˆ(h0) of Γˆ such that player i acts at node h0 and player i has a profitable
deviation which only deviates from σˆ at h0.
Consider the subgame Γˆ(h0). We complete the proof by showing that a one-shot devia-
tion from σˆi cannot by profitable. To simplify the notation, we divide utility by δt, where
t is the period corresponding to the subgame’s first node h0.
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Suppose player i ∈ S is a proposer in the first node of Γˆ(h0). The use of strategy σˆi
leads to a proposal xi = X − δziT , which is unanimously accepted by all responders, and
leads to utility X − δziT for player i.
Proposing x > xi leads to rejection by a player in T. Whenever players j ∈ S are next
selected as a proposer, they propose X − δzjT , and players j ∈ T propose δzjS. The utility
of player i is therefore equal to
δ
(∑
j∈S
piij(X − δzjT ) +
∑
j∈T
piijδz
j
S
)
.
Since z is a solution to the characteristic equations, this expression equals δziS. From
δziS + δz
i
T = δX, it follows that δz
i
S < X − δziT , and player i looses utility by proposing
x > xi.
Now consider a proposal x by i satisfying x < xi. If this proposal is accepted, it leads
to utility for i less than X − δziT . If it is rejected, then by the same argument as before, it
will lead to utility δziS, which is less than X − δziT .
Suppose player i ∈ T is a proposer in the first node of Γˆ(h0). Then a fully analogous
argument shows that he does not have a profitable one-shot deviation.
Suppose player i ∈ S is a responder in the first node of Γˆ(h0) and responds to a proposal
x ∈ [0, X] by a player j. If i is asked to respond to this proposal, then according to σˆi
acceptance takes place if x ≥ δzjS, and results in utility equal to x if all players responding
after player i accept x or to δzjS otherwise. A deviation to rejection leads to utility δz
j
S,
and is therefore not profitable. If x < δzjS, then player i rejects the proposal when playing
according to σˆi, and obtains utility δzjS. A deviation from rejection to acceptance results
in utility equal to x if all players responding after player i accept x or to δzjS otherwise,
and is therefore not profitable.
Suppose player i ∈ T is a responder in the first node of the subgame and responds to
a proposal x ∈ [0, X] by a player j. Then a fully analogous argument shows that he does
not have a profitable one-shot deviation.
Example 3.1. Suppose the coalition S is a singleton consisting of player i1, T = {i2, . . . , in},
and the identity of the proposer cycles within the player set: i1, i2, i3, . . . , in, i1. The system
of characteristic equations (1)–(2) yields
zi1T = X − δzi2S ,
z
ij
S = δz
ij+1
S , j = 2, . . . , n− 1,
zinS = X − δzi1T .
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Solving it, we find
zi1T =
1− δn−1
1− δn X,
so the equilibrium proposal of player i1 equals
xi1 = X − δzi1T =
1− δ
1− δnX.
This proposal will be accepted by all players in equilibrium. The equilibrium utility of
player i1 is
1− δ
1− δnX
and the equilibrium utility of players in T is
δ − δn
1− δnX.
Since 1 − δ does not necessarily exceed δ − δn, the equilibrium utility of the first mover,
player i1, may be lower than that of the players in T.
In subgames (that will not be reached in equilibrium) where a player ik, k = 2, . . . , n,
has to make a proposal, it is equal to
xik = δ
n−k+1 1− δ
1− δnX,
which equals δn−k+1 times the proposal of player i1.
In a subgame where player i2 makes a proposal, he may propose a low value of x, since
a long time will elapse before a player belonging to the opposing coalition can make a
proposal. In a subgame where player in makes a proposal, he knows that player i1 will be
the next proposer, so he proposes a relatively high value of x. Observe that we obtain the
Rubinstein (1982) result for the case where n = 2.
If, for fixed δ, the number of players n goes to infinity, then the equilibrium proposal of
player i1 converges to (1− δ)X, the proposal of player i2 to 0, and the proposal of player
in to δ(1 − δ)X. If, for a fixed number of players, δ converges to 1, then the equilibrium
proposals of all players converge to X/n.
Example 3.2. Suppose the coalition S consists of the first k agents, coalition T equals
N \ {1, . . . , k}, and players are selected randomly to be the proposer, pi0i = 1/n for all
i ∈ N, and piij = 1/n for all i, j ∈ N . For i ∈ N, the system of characteristic equations
(1)–(2) is then equal to
ziT =
n− k
n
X + δ
∑
j∈S
1
n
zjT − δ
∑
j∈T
1
n
zjS,
ziS =
k
n
X − δ
∑
j∈S
1
n
zjT + δ
∑
j∈T
1
n
zjS.
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Solving it, we find
ziS =
k
n
X,
ziT =
n− k
n
X.
The equilibrium proposal of a player i = 1, . . . , k equals
xi = X − δziT =
δk + (1− δ)n
n
X = δ
k
n
X + (1− δ)X.
This proposal will be accepted by all players in equilibrium. The equilibrium proposal of
a player i = k + 1, . . . , n is given by
xi = δ
k
n
X.
The larger the ratio k/n, the higher the fraction of players belonging to coalition S, and
the higher the proposed value of x.
The expected utility of a player i ∈ S is given by
k
n
(δ
k
n
X + (1− δ)X) + n− k
n
δ
k
n
X =
k
n
X.
Also the expected proposal is equal to (k/n)X. The expected utility of a player i ∈ T
equals ((n−k)/n)X. In this example, expected utilities are equal to expected continuation
utilities.
If, for fixed δ and a fixed size of coalition S, the number of players in T goes to infinity,
then the equilibrium proposal of players in S converges to (1 − δ)X, and the proposal of
players in T converges to 0. If, for fixed δ and a fixed size of coalition T , the number of
players in S goes to infinity, then the equilibrium proposal of players in S converges to
X, and the proposal of players in T converges to δX. If, for a fixed number of players, δ
converges to 1, then the equilibrium proposals of all players converge to (k/n)X.
4 Uniqueness of Equilibrium in One-dimensional Bar-
gaining Games
In this section we show that subgame perfect equilibrium utilities are unique, and therefore
correspond to the ones following from σˆ.
For i ∈ N, let Γˆi denote the class of subgames of the game Γˆ starting with player i
in the role of proposer. Since all subgames in Γˆi are strategically equivalent, the set of
subgame perfect equilibrium strategies of Γˆi is well-defined. The utilities of two games
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in the class Γˆi differ from each other only by a power of δ. The set of subgame perfect
equilibrium utilities in a game in Γˆi discounted by 1/δt, where t denotes the starting period
of the game, is the same for all games in Γˆi.
For i ∈ N, and C ∈ {S, T}, let uiC (uiC) be the infimum (supremum) of the discounted
utilities to coalition C over all subgame perfect equilibria of Γˆi. Let ziC (z
i
C) be the infinum
(supremum) of the continuation utilities to coalition C following the rejection of a proposal
by player i over all subgame perfect equilibria of the game Γˆi.
The following result asserts that, for i ∈ N, for C ∈ {S, T}, uiC = u¯iC , and ziC = z¯iC .
This result implies that subgame perfect equilibrium utilities are unique.
Theorem 4.1 For any Γˆ, for i ∈ N and C ∈ {S, T}, uiC = u¯iC and ziC = z¯iC . In any
subgame perfect equilibrium, agreement is reached without delay.
Proof. Since rejection of a proposal by player i leads to a subgame in Γˆj with probability
piij, it holds that z
i
C ≥
∑
j∈N piiju
j
C . Similarly, it can be derived that z
i
C ≤
∑
j∈N piiju
j
C . Let
∆ be the maximum of the differences uiC − uiC over all i and C. Then ziC − ziC ≤ ∆ for all
i and C. We show that ∆ = 0.
First we establish the following inequalities. For C ∈ {S, T}, for all i ∈ C,
δziN\C ≤ uiN\C ≤ uiN\C ≤ δziN\C ,
X − δziN\C ≤ uiC ≤ uiC ≤ X − δziN\C .
We start with C = T. The inequality δziS ≤ uiS follows from the fact that when a player of
coalition S rejects a proposal of player i ∈ T, he obtains a utility of at least ziS in the next
period. His subgame perfect equilibrium utility can therefore not be less than δziS.
Let (viS, v
i
T ) be subgame perfect equilibrium utilities. Then v
i
T ≤ X − viS, where the
inequality comes from the fact that there might be delay before an agreement is reached,
so utilities may sum to less than X. As a consequence, uiT ≤ X − uiS, which yields the
inequality uiT ≤ X − δziS.
Now suppose player i ∈ T makes a proposal x > δziS. We will argue that in a subgame
perfect equilibrium this leads to utilities of at least X − x to i, and therefore to players
in T. First the players in T respond in the order i1, . . . , i`, next the players in S in the
sequence j1, . . . , jk. If player jk is given the option to respond, it means that all other
players have accepted the proposal. If player jk accepts, his utility is x, otherwise it is at
most δziS. Player jk will accept therefore. By a backwards induction argument it follows
that all players j1, . . . , jk will accept the proposal. Consider next player i`. Acceptance by
player i` leads to utilities X − x, rejection will therefore only occur if it leads to utilities
at least equal to X − x, meaning that the utility to any player in T is at least X − x. By
a backwards induction argument it follows that player i1, the first to respond, can ensure
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a utility of at least X − x by accepting x. Thus, player i can guarantee himself a utility
of at least X − x for any x > δziS by proposing x. This shows that X − δziS ≤ uiT . The
inequality uiS ≤ δziS follows. The case C = S is similar.
The above inequalities imply that for all C ∈ {S, T}, for i ∈ C,
uiN\C − uiN\C ≤ δ(ziN\C − ziN\C) and uiC − uiC ≤ δ(ziN\C − ziN\C).
Since ∆ is defined as the maximum of the differences uiC − uiC over i and C, we can derive
the inequality ∆ ≤ δ∆. Thus ∆ = 0, as desired.
We have thus proved that for all i ∈ N, for all C ∈ {S, T}, uiC = u¯iC , and ziC = z¯iC .
Theorem 3.2 pins down the equilibrium utility levels. Since delay of agreements would
lead to different utility levels, equilibrium agreement is reached without delay in any sub-
game perfect equilibrium.
In general, Γˆ may have more than one subgame perfect equilibrium, but the multiplicity
is inessential in the following sense. Assume for instance that coalition S consists of two
players, i1 and i2, and suppose that the players respond to proposals in this order. If a
player j in T makes a proposal smaller than δzjS, the players in S will reject this proposal
in any subgame perfect equilibrium. It is completely irrelevant, however, whether this
proposal will be rejected by i1, or whether i1 accepts this proposal and has it rejected by
i2. In fact, even a member of T different from j may reject the, from his perspective, very
favorable proposal, anticipating that some player in S will reject it anyway. What matters
is not the responses by individual players, but how the coalition S ∪ T \ {j} reacts to
proposals.
Let H be the set of all decision nodes of the extensive form game Γˆ. We denote the
decision nodes where some player has to make a proposal by Hp, and the decision nodes
immediately following nodes in Hp, so nodes where the first player responds, by Hr. Given
a strategy profile σ, for h ∈ Hp, σp(h) denotes the proposal made at decision node h, and
for h ∈ Hr, σr(h) = 1 if the proposal is accepted by all players, and σr(h) = 0, otherwise.
Let σ be a subgame perfect equilibrium strategy profile. It is not hard to show that
σ is essentially equivalent to σˆ in the following sense. For any h ∈ Hp, σp(h) = σˆp(h).
For any h ∈ Hr where the proposal under discussion is x by player j ∈ S, if x 6= δzjS,
then σr(h) = σˆr(h). For any h ∈ Hr where the proposal under discussion is x by player
j ∈ T, if x 6= X − δzjT , then σr(h) = σˆr(h). Subgame perfect equilibrium proposals are
therefore unique. Only in subgames where by mistake a player j ∈ S proposes xj = δzjS,
so leaving players in his own coalition indifferent between accepting and rejecting, or in
subgames where by mistake a player j ∈ T proposes xj = X − δzjT , so leaving players in
his own coalition indifferent between accepting and rejecting, could there be a difference
in response behavior at the coalition level.
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Let Γˆ(X) be a one-dimensional bargaining game with cake size X. Consider any sub-
game perfect equilibrium of Γˆ(X). The continuation utility of a member of coalition C
after rejecting a proposal by player i is ziC(X). The variable u
i
C(X) denotes the expected
utility of a member of coalition C in a subgame starting with a proposal by player i. The
variable u∗C(X) is the expected utility of a player i ∈ C as evaluated at the beginning of
the game. The next result specifies how these variables can be computed, and claims that
all utilities are linear functions of X. The latter property is crucial to derive our results for
sequential share bargaining games.
Theorem 4.2 Consider any subgame perfect equilibrium of Γˆ(X). Then (ziS(X), z
i
T (X))i∈N
are given by the solution to (1)–(2). Moreover, for C ∈ {S, T}, for i ∈ N \ C,
uiC(X) = δz
i
C(X),
uiN\C(X) = X − δziC(X),
and
u∗C(X) =
∑
j∈N
pi0ju
j
N\C(X).
All the functions above are linear in X.
Proof. The expressions above follow in a straightforward way from Theorems 3.2 and
4.1. It follows from the proof of Theorem 3.1 that the solution to system (3) is given by
zS(X) = (1 − δ)X(I − δpi)−1piS, where piS = ((piiS)i∈N)>. It follows that ziS(X) is linear
in X. Since ziT (X) = X − ziS(X), it holds that ziT (X) is linear in X. Linearity of uiS(X),
uiT (X), u
∗
S(X), and u
∗
T (X) is now immediate.
5 Sequential Share Bargaining
In this section we consider the problem of dividing a cake of size X¯ among n¯ players. Our
approach is to chop up the problem into n one-dimensional bargaining procedures that are
implemented sequentially, one after another. First, the players decide upon the share of
the cake to be allocated to the first player on the agenda, say player 1. Once player 1’s
share is unanimously agreed upon by all active players, including player 1, he leaves the
game. The remaining players then decide what share of the cake to allocate to the next
player on the agenda, say player 2. Once this is unanimously agreed upon, player 2 exits,
and the remaining players decide upon the share of player 3, and so on.
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A sequential share bargaining game Γ is specified by a set of players N¯ with cardinality
n¯, a cake size X¯, a discount factor δ, utility functions (ui)i∈N¯ , an agenda ρ, n¯ initial
probability distributions, (pi01, . . . , pi0n¯), and n¯ Markov transition matrices, (pi1, . . . , pin¯).
All players have the same utility function. The utility of player i ∈ N¯ when receiving
the share x in time period t is ui(t, x) = δ
tx. The utility of perpetual disagreement is 0.
The agenda ρ is a permutation, an injective function mapping {1, . . . , n¯} into the set
of players N¯ . The agenda ρ specifies the sequence in which the players’ shares are decided
upon. The player whose share is decided upon first is ρ(1). If his share is specified, the
remaining players N = N¯ \ {ρ(1)} decide upon player ρ(2)’s share. For k = 1, . . . , n¯,
ρk = {i ∈ N¯ | ρ−1(i) ≥ k} denotes the set of players, whose position on the agenda is k or
higher. After the shares of players ρ(1), . . . , ρ(k − 1) have been decided upon, the players
in ρk discuss the share of player ρ(k).
The way to decide upon the share of a given player is the bargaining procedure as
detailed below. Let N = ρk be the set of players that determines the share of player ρ(k)
in a cake of size X ≤ X¯ in a time period t. Nature chooses a proposer from the set N
according to the probability distribution pi0k, where pi0ki is the probability that player i
is selected as a proposer. The chosen player announces a number x ∈ [0, X], the share
of the cake to be allocated to player ρ(k). The remaining players respond sequentially to
the proposal. If ρ(k) is not the proposer himself, he is the last player to respond. If the
proposal is unanimously accepted, then player ρ(k) exits the game with share x. The
players ρk+1 = N \ {ρ(k)} continue bargaining, and determine the share of player ρ(k+ 1)
in a cake of size X − x in time period t. If the proposal is rejected, period t+1 begins and
nature chooses a new proposer in N. The moves of nature that select the proposer follow
a Markov process with N as state space. The matrix of transition probabilities is given by
pik, where pikij is the transition probability from state i to state j. The bargaining process
proceeds in this way until the share of all players has been decided upon.
Our procedure differs from the bargaining games with exit as discussed in the intro-
duction in that no player is allowed to take any part of the cake unless all other players
agree. In contrast, in a game with exit, a player can receive a share offered to this player
by a proposer without the consent of other players.
For k = 1, . . . , n¯, and 0 ≤ X ≤ X¯, we denote a subgame of Γ where the set of players
N = ρk determines the share of player ρ(k) and the size of the cake is X by Γ(N,X).
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6 Uniqueness of Equilibrium in Sequential Share Bar-
gaining Games
In this section we prove that sequential share bargaining games have unique subgame
perfect equilibrium utilities. The gist of the argument is as follows. All sequential share
bargaining games Γ(ρn¯, X) = Γ({ρ(n¯)}, X) are trivial, and have trivial subgame perfect
equilibrium utilities. Suppose we have shown, for some k = 2, . . . , n¯, that all sequential
share bargaining games Γ(ρk, X) have unique subgame perfect equilibrium utilities.
Consider a game Γ(N,X), where N = ρk−1. For x ∈ [0, X], we replace all subgames
Γ(ρk, X − x) of the game Γ(N,X) by their subgame perfect equilibrium utilities. The
resulting reduced game is denoted Γˆ(N,X). As we show in the proof of Theorem 6.1, the
game thus obtained is a one-dimensional bargaining game with coalitions S = {ρ(k − 1)}
and T = ρk. Subgame perfect equilibrium utilities of Γ(N,X) are therefore unique by The-
orem 4.1, and a subgame perfect equilibrium of Γ(N,X) is found using the characteristic
equations for the one-dimensional bargaining game.
A subgame perfect equilibrium strategy profile σ∗ of Γ(N¯ , X¯) is defined as follows.
Suppose the set of active players is N and the cake size is X, where N = ρk for some
k = 1, . . . , n¯, and 0 ≤ X ≤ X¯. Let S = {ρ(k)} and T = ρk+1. Let ziC(N,X) for
i ∈ N and C ∈ {S, T} denote the solution to the system (1)–(2) of characteristic equations
with the matrix of transition probabilities equal to pik. Then player ρ(k) makes a proposal
xi = X−δziT (N,X) and accepts a proposal xj of player j ∈ T if and only if xj ≥ δzjS(N,X).
Player i of coalition T makes a proposal xi = δz
i
S(N,X) and accepts a proposal xj of
player j ∈ N if and only if xj ≤ X − δzjT (N,X). In particular, equilibrium proposals are
unanimously accepted.
Theorem 6.1 The strategy profile σ∗ is a subgame perfect equilibrium of the game Γ. The
subgame perfect equilibrium utilities of Γ are unique. In any subgame perfect equilibrium,
agreement is reached without delay.
Proof. We show first that the subgame perfect equilibrium utilities of Γ are uniquely
determined. The proof of Theorem 6.1 is by induction on the number of active players
in the subgames. It is trivially true that for all one–player subgames Γ(ρn¯, X) discounted
equilibrium utilities are unique, and are linear as a function of X. Suppose this statement
is true for all games with set of players ρk, where 2 ≤ k ≤ n¯. Let ui(ρk, X) denote the
discounted equilibrium utility of player i ∈ ρk in the game Γ(ρk, X).
Consider the game Γ(ρk−1, X). Suppose that in period t the players in ρk−1 unanimously
agree to allocate the share x of the cake to player ρ(k − 1). In this case player ρ(k − 1)
obtains x and the remaining players enter the game Γ(ρk, X−x) in period t. Replacing the
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subgame Γ(ρk, X − x) of the game Γ(ρk−1, X) by its subgame perfect equilibrium utilities
δtx for player ρ(k − 1) and δtui(ρk, X − x) for each i ∈ ρk, yields a reduced game denoted
by Γˆ(ρk−1, X). The game Γˆ(ρk−1, X) is a one-dimensional bargaining game as defined in
Section 2, with coalitions S = {ρ(k− 1)} and T = ρk. Because ui(ρk, ·) is linear, the utility
functions δtui(ρ
k, X − x) are for all i ∈ ρk equivalent to the utility function δt(X − x), so
Theorems 4.1 and 4.2 apply. This completes the induction hypothesis and shows that the
game Γ has uniquely determined subgame perfect equilibrium utilities.
A similar induction argument together with Theorem 3.2 can be used to show that σ∗
is a subgame perfect equilibrium of the game Γ. This strategy determines the equilibrium
utility levels. Since delay of agreement would lead to different utility levels, it follows that
in any subgame perfect equilibrium, agreement is reached without delay.
In general, Γ may have more than one subgame perfect equilibrium. Since each subgame
of Γ can be reduced to a one-dimensional bargaining game, the multiplicity is inessential
in exactly the same way as for one-dimensional bargaining games. When the set of active
players is ρk and a proposal is made which is unacceptable to some of the players in ρk, i.e.
a player j ∈ ρk makes a proposal smaller than δzj{ρ(k)}(ρk, X) or a proposal greater than
X − δzj
ρk+1
(ρk, X), it does not matter which player in ρk rejects the proposal. Aggregate
behavior is uniquely determined, except in subgames with at least three active players,
where by mistake a player j ∈ ρk+1 proposes xj = X − δzjρk+1(ρk, X), so leaving players
in his own coalition indifferent between accepting and rejecting. The other case where
aggregate behavior was not uniquely determined in one-dimensional bargaining, where by
mistake player ρ(k) proposes xρ(k) = δz
ρ(k)
{ρ(k)}(ρ
k, X), does not occur in sequential share
bargaining, since player ρ(k) does not have any coalition members. Such a proposal would
be accepted in all subgame perfect equilibria by the members of ρk+1.
We make a final remark with regard to the solution ziC(N,X) to the system (1)–(2) of
characteristic equations. Recall that ziT (N,X) is the continuation utility of any player j in
T in the game Γˆ(N,X) after a proposal by player i has been rejected, relative to the specific
utility representation δt(X − x) of that player’s preferences. To obtain the continuation
utility in the game Γ(N,X) we must transform ziT (N,X) using the utility function uj(T, ·),
where uj(T,X) denotes the equilibrium utility of player j ∈ T in the game Γ(T,X). Thus
uj(T, z
i
T (N,X)) is the continuation utility of player j ∈ T in the subgame Γ(N,X) after a
proposal by player i has been rejected. For the unique player in S, no transformation is
required: ziS(N,X) is the continuation utility of player S after a rejection of a proposal by
player i.
Example 6.1. Consider a game Γ(N¯ , X¯) where N¯ = {1, . . . , n¯}. Let ρ be the identity,
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so the sequence in which the players’ shares are determined is 1, . . . , n¯. In each subgame
Γ(N,X) with N = ρk for some k = 1, . . . , n¯, the identity of the proposer cycles clockwise
within the player set: k, k + 1, . . . , n¯, k, . . . Thus, when player k is on top of the agenda,
it is player k who is the first player to make a proposal. We know that all equilibrium
proposals are immediately accepted. This means that the equilibrium proposal xk of player
k, when player k is on top of the agenda, is also player k’s equilibrium utility.
We claim that
xk = δ
k−1 1− δ
1− δn¯ X¯.
The argument is by induction on k. To see that the claim is true for k = 1, observe that
the reduced game Γˆ(N¯ , X¯) is the one–dimensional bargaining game of Example 3.1 with
S = {1}, T = {2, . . . , n¯}, and cake size X¯. The formula for x1 then follows from the result
of Example 3.1. Suppose the claim is true for all i = 1, . . . , k. We prove that it holds for
i = k + 1.
Suppose that the players 1, . . . , k have left the game. The remaining players ρk+1 =
{k+1, . . . , n¯} are then dividing a cake of size X = X¯ − x1− · · · − xk. Using the induction
hypothesis, this can be seen to be equal to
X = δk
1− δn¯−k
1− δn¯ X¯.
The reduced game Γˆ(N,X) is the one–dimensional bargaining game of Example 3.1 with
S = {k + 1} and T = {k + 2, . . . , n¯}. Player k + 1 then makes a proposal
xk+1 =
1− δ
1− δn¯−kX = δ
k 1− δ
1− δn¯ X¯,
which establishes the claim.
Example 6.2. Consider a game Γ(N¯ , X¯) where N¯ = {1, . . . , n¯}. As in the previous
example, the agenda ρ equals the identity, so the sequence in which the players’ shares
are determined is 1, . . . , n¯. The proposer is chosen randomly from the set of active players
with equal probabilities.
We claim that the expected equilibrium utility of any player is X¯/n¯. First we show
that the expected equilibrium utility of player 1 is X¯/n¯. The reduced game Γˆ(N¯ , X¯) is
the one–dimensional bargaining game of Example 3.2 with S = {1}, T = {2, . . . , n¯}, and
cake size X¯. We know that in the game Γˆ(N¯ , X¯) the equilibrium proposal of player 1 is
[n¯− δ(n¯− 1)]X¯/n¯, while the equilibrium proposal of any member of coalition T is δX¯/n¯.
Since the identity of the proposer is uniformly distributed in N¯ , the expected share of
player 1, which is also player 1’s expected utility, is
1
n¯
n¯− δ(n¯− 1)
n¯
X¯ +
(n¯− 1)
n¯
δ
n¯
X¯ =
X¯
n¯
.
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Suppose the claim is true for all i = 1, . . . , k. We prove that it holds for i = k + 1.
Suppose the players 1, . . . , k have left the game with shares x1, . . . , xk. The remaining
players N = {k+1, . . . , n¯} are then dividing a cake of size X = X¯−x1−· · ·−xk. Now the
shares x1, . . . , xk and the leftover X are random functions, as they depend on the moves of
nature (the k choices of proposers prior to the exit of player k). Because by the induction
hypothesis the expected value of xi for each i = 1, . . . , k is X¯/n¯, the expected value of X
is (n¯− k)X¯/n¯.
Given a specific realization of X, consider a reduced game Γˆ(N,X). This is the one–
dimensional bargaining game of Example 3.2 with S = {k + 1} and T = {k + 2, . . . , n¯}.
Notice that the cardinality of N is n¯ − k. We know that in Γˆ(N,X) the equilibrium
proposal of player k+1 is (n¯− k− δ(n¯− k− 1))X/(n¯− k) and the equilibrium proposal of
each member of coalition T is δX/(n¯− k). Since the identity of the proposer is uniformly
distributed on N , the expected share of player k conditional on X is
1
n¯− k
n¯− k − δ(n¯− k − 1)
n¯− k X¯ +
(n¯− k − 1)
n¯− k
δ
n¯− kX =
X
n¯− k .
This expression is linear in X. To compute the unconditional expected share (or utility)
of player k, we substitute the expected value of X for X in the formula above. This yields
X¯/n¯, as desired.
7 Conclusions
The existing results on n-player bargaining problems with unanimous agreement point
towards a large multiplicity of subgame perfect equilibria. This is a very unpleasant result,
since it implies that the predictive power of the model is extremely limited.
There are several ways to extend the Rubinstein-St˚ahl bargaining model for 2 players
to the case with n players. This paper considers the case where the shares of the players
are not determined simultaneously, but sequentially, thereby removing a potential source
of multiplicity of equilibria.
The paper obtains unique subgame perfect equilibrium utilities for this bargaining
procedure. In equilibrium, proposals are accepted without delay. Our results for n players
are qualitatively the same as the results for the two player case. The paper also studies
a related class of bargaining problems, called one-dimensional bargaining problems, and
obtains a uniqueness result there as well.
Our results imply that the choice of the bargaining procedure is important in obtaining
desirable bargaining outcomes. The idea of determining the players’ shares sequentially is
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natural, and avoids the coordination problem that occurs when all shares are determined
at the same time.
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